Scan, lock, and gate your Agent Skills
The npm audit + lockfile + CI drift gate for the SKILL.md era. One command against prompt injection, rug-pulls, credential leaks, and hidden-Unicode smuggling.
npx skillwarden scan$ skillwarden ci --fail-on high ✔ changelog-writer 3 files · matches lock ✔ code-reviewer 5 files · matches lock ⚠ web-helper hidden-unicode: zero-width chars in SKILL.md ✖ deploy-buddy prompt-injection: "ignore previous instructions" ✖ notes-skill content drift from skillwarden.lock 2 gate failures · 1 warning · exit code 1 Gate closed. Review drift with `skillwarden diff`.
One loop, four gates
Everything fragmented across five point tools today, in a single coherent workflow.
scan
Deterministic, offline analysis: prompt injection, hidden Unicode, dangerous commands, credential leaks, exfiltration, obfuscated scripts.
lock
Pin every file of every approved skill (per-file SHA-256) into skillwarden.lock. Rug-pulls can’t hide.
gate
skillwarden ci fails on any drift from the approved baseline or findings at your severity threshold.
advise
Cross-check skills against a public, structured Agent Skills advisory database (SKA-YYYY-NNNN).
Gate your agent in three steps
- 1
Scan & lock
One
npxcommand; auto-discovers.claude/skills,.agents/skills,.codex/skills, and more, then pins every file's SHA-256 intoskillwarden.lock. - 2
Gate in CI
Add one CI step (or the GitHub Action). Any upstream drift turns the build red.
- 3
Gate installs
Run SkillWarden as OpenClaw's install policy: skills are scanned before they ever reach the agent.
# 1. scan and lock (no install needed) $ npx skillwarden scan $ npx skillwarden lock # 2. gate in CI $ npx skillwarden ci --fail-on high # 3. gate installs into OpenClaw $ skillwarden openclaw-install-policy
Eight deterministic scan rules
Aligned with real-world skills-ecosystem threats — plus a public, structured Agent Skills advisory database. No account, no API key, no LLM, no network.
prompt-injectioncritical“Ignore previous instructions”, concealment, fake system markers, precedence claims.
hidden-unicodecriticalZero-width characters, bidi controls, and Unicode tag-block instruction smuggling.
exfiltrationhighEnv secrets in network requests, ~/.ssh reads, dead-drop endpoints, ephemeral tunnels.